The Stolen Archives of the Military Dictatorship
Greg Chamberlain

October 1998

Should Haiti accept the US government's offer to return, in censored form, the archives of the defeated army dictatorship and its paramilitary ally, the FRAPH, which were seized during the 1994 US invasion?

The return of the documents in whatever form will not guarantee the trial, fair or otherwise, of accused human rights violators in the present dilapidated state of Haiti's judicial apparatus. The few attempts so far to do this have ended in farce, because of incompetent judges and lawyers and the ease with which, in a context of poverty, defendants can buy their freedom.

The contents of the documents (variously counted as 60,000 pages or 160,000) might also, some fear, be "abused" through misinterpretation or misunderstanding of them, because of the way such information is often handled in Haiti.

None of this alters the absolute right of the Haitian authorities to have the documents returned to them intact, without the small amount of censorship proposed by the US to protect its own citizens who figure in them along with those Haitians and Americans who worked with the US intelligence services, the CIA and the DIA..

On whose authority did the US invade Haiti? It gained the consent of both the army leaders (under pressure) and Aristide (though he doesn't like to admit it). The US might plead that one of these consenting parties (the army leaders) agreed that (to protect themselves and their allies) the documents could be removed (though in practice they weren't asked). But since the other party consenting to the invasion (Aristide) would have been opposed if he had been asked -- and it was Aristide the US was restoring -- the theft (which took place in the month after the invasion and before Aristide returned under US auspices and protection) could be considered "illegal."

Some think the Haitian authorities should now take what has long been on offer -- the censored version of the documents (the extent of the censorship has been much exaggerated because of the emotion surrounding the issue) -- and get on with holding a few trials, which would probably be little hindered by the censored passages, and try to satisfy the thirst for justice and for coming to terms with the recent past.

But politics and psychology don't allow this practical solution. National dignity, however "impractical" the consequences, gets in the way. Refusing to accept the documents in censored form is also a convenient delaying tactic for the government, which knows that even if its demand for the uncensored version were met, it has scant resources to mount proper trials. Much important legal preparation could be started however if the government accepted the documents as presently offered.

Copyright © 1998 Greg Chamberlain